




DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 




"AN EYE FOR AN EYE, A TOOTH FOR A 
TOOTH." A STUDY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 







David Fielding, University of Otago, New Zealand 








Working Paper No. 05/11 
May 2005 
 
 "An Eye for an Eye, a Tooth for a Tooth."  












This paper analyses a newly collected time-series database measuring the 
dimensions of violent political conflict in Egypt. Attention is focused on the 
interaction between politically motivated attacks by Islamists and the 
counter-insurgency measures used by the Egyptian government. The 
intensity of security force activities responds immediately to all kinds of 
Islamist violence, regardless of the target of the attack. However, there are 
significant asymmetries in the way that the different forms of Islamist 
violence respond to the different security force activities. 
 
Keywords: Egypt, Islamist violence, counter-insurgency, political rights, 
civil liberties 
 
                                                 
* We would like to acknowledge the support of the ESRC (research grant number RES-000-22-0312) and 
excellent research assistance from Basel Saleh, who helped us to construct the dataset used in the paper. 
§ Department of Economics, University of Otago, PO Box 56, Dunedin 9001, New Zealand. E-mail 
dfielding@business.otago.ac.nz. 
¶ Department of Economics, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester LE1 7RH, UK. E-mail 
aks13@le.ac.uk.   1
1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen a large increase in the number of politically motivated violent attacks 
organised by Islamist movements, for example in Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Indonesia, Kenya 
and Turkey. There is a large and growing literature on the socio-economic consequences of 
political violence, which shows that savings, investment, tourism and faith in the domestic 
currency suffer when political violence increases.
1 However, it is not clear how governments 
should respond to a rise in Islamist (or any politically motivated) violence.
2 On the one hand a 
crack-down by the security forces on Islamist movements acts as a potential deterrent and 
disrupts the organisation of terrorist groups. On the other hand a violent state response risks 
escalating the conflict as more civilians take up arms to avenge arrests and killing of family 
and friends.
3 The Human Rights Watch (1994) cites a member of the Egyptian al-Jama’a al-
Islamiyya  organisation: “Bullets against bullets, according to the law of retaliation.”
4 
Evidence of the effects of different approaches to resolving the problem of Islamist violence 
will therefore be valuable. 
  Egypt has a long history of political conflict between the state and Islamist opposition, 
with Islamist groups having been excluded or marginalised in the political process. This paper 
presents an analysis of time-series data on the Egyptian conflict recently collected as part of 
an ESRC-funded research project. We examine the effects of arrests, the shooting of 
(suspected) extremists and clampdowns on political rights on the violence of Islamist 
movements from 1988 to 2000. We also compare this with the effects of non-violent means of 
dealing with Islamist groups. In addition, we examine the ways in which the security forces 
themselves have reacted to different forms of political violence, in order to find out which 
forms of violence are perceived to be the greatest threat to the state.  
  We find that arrests of suspected Islamists can be predicted from data on violence 
directed against tourists and casualties among Egyptians (both civilians and security agents) 
in previous months. Some civilians are also killed or wounded by the security forces, mostly 
because of heavy-handed policing during riots and arrests; these casualties can also be 
predicted from past fatalities in Islamist attacks. Security force activities in turn contribute to 
subsequent Islamist violence. However, there are important differences between the Islamists’ 
response to arrests and their response to an increased number of casualties in security force 
operations. Moreover, certain kinds of anti-state violence are also responsive to economic 
                                                 
1 See Frey et al (2004) for a review of this literature. 
2 See Sederberg (1995) for further discussion. 
3 See for example Yom and Saleh (2004), who discuss these issues in relation to Palestinian suicide bombers.  
4 See www.hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/Middle-02.htm.   2
conditions under government control, and to Egyptians’ political rights and civil liberties, 
which were substantially restricted in December 1992. Implicit in these results is the 
conclusion that economic subsidies and political freedoms (both costly to the state, but in 
different ways) are alternative ways to reduce the incidence of Islamist violence. 
The next section of the paper briefly reviews the political history of modern Egypt, as 
it relates to the rise of radical Islamism. Section 3 then discusses our quantitative measures of 
the different dimensions of Islamist violence and the state’s response. The model employed to 
analyse these data is presented in Section 4.  
 
2. Historical and Political Background 
Egypt is a secular state in which Islamist movements have been excluded or marginalised in 
the political process. Islamist movements were banned in 1954 after an assassination attempt 
on President Nasser. A revival of Islamist groups began in the 1970s, their long-term goal 
being the establishment of an Islamic republic. Having been excluded from the political 
process, some radical Islamist groups such as al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad started a 
campaign of politically motivated violence. In the 1970s this was mainly inter-community 
violence between Islamists and the Coptic Christian minority. In 1979 violence increased in 
intensity in response to Egypt’s rapprochement with Israel and the government’s pro-Western 
stance. Attacks were increasingly targeted at the state, taking the form of riots, shoot-outs 
with the police and assassination attempts on politicians and other public figures, most 
notably the assassination of President Anwar Sadat and a militant uprising in Asyut in 1981.  
The assassination of President Sadat was followed by mass arrests and large-scale 
trials of Islamist militants. Even though these arrests and trials added to the grievances of the 
Islamists, the years from 1983 to 1987 were relatively calm in Egypt. There was a tacit 
understanding that local security forces would tolerate the Islamist groups if they limited their 
activities to preaching in Upper Egypt. Attacks during this period were mainly by al-Jama’a 
al-Islamiyya on civilians in breach of shari’a laws. In the 1987 election the non-violent 
Islamist opposition gained a foothold in parliament, but the political success of the moderates 
did not convince the radicals to follow a non-violent strategy. Instead, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya 
and al-Jihad increased their violent activities and started operations in Cairo. The government 
responded to these violent incidents with mass arrests and the storming of mosques. This 
turned public opinion against the government, and the conflict between the state and Islamist 
movements escalated in the early 1990s. Violence decreased sharply after the 1997 killing of 
over 70 tourists in Luxor, which turned public opinion against terrorist activity; thereafter al-  3
Jama’a al-Islamiyya became increasingly committed to non-violence (Al Sayyid, 2003). The 
period of violence and counter-violence from 1988 to 2000 is the focus of this paper.  
State measures against the Islamist opposition in Egypt have been twofold. On the one 
hand there has been political repression of varying intensity. In some periods all Islamists 
have been completely excluded from the political process; in others there has been limited 
participation by moderate Islamist groups in a polity dominated by the governing National 
Democratic Party. On the other hand there has been violent suppression of both moderate and 
(suspected) radical Islamists by the security forces.  
To strengthen its hand against domestic opposition the Egyptian government has 
operated under continuous “emergency rule” since the assassination of President Anwar Sadat 
in 1981.
5 The Emergency Law grants the government exceptional legal powers that 
effectively void the human rights guarantees in Egypt's constitution. It allows the arbitrary 
arrest and indefinite detention of suspects without trial and the option of trying civilians in 
military courts that do not meet international fair trial standards.
6 Human rights organisations 
report examples of torture and the arrest of family members of wanted suspects. Emergency 
rule has been widely used to criminalize political dissent and to undermine the freedom of the 
press. It is possible that these general restrictions of political freedom have been 
complementary to direct action against Islamist extremists: that is, the intensity of anti-
Islamist state activity has been facilitated by the legal changes. On the other hand, the arrests 
and attacks on Islamists might have been a substitute for the repression embodied in the legal 
changes. 
 
3. Measuring the Conflict 
3.1 State control and repression 
Our statistical analysis is based on a number of measures of the intensity of Islamist 
insurgency and the intensity of the political repression organised by the state. We first discuss 
our measurement of the intensity of the use of force to suppress Islamist movements in Egypt. 
Under the Emergency Law, the Egyptian security forces are able to respond to both Islamist 
violence and peaceful political dissent with mass arrests and detentions.
7 If suspected 
extremists resist arrests then casualties usually ensue: suspects, innocent bystanders and 
                                                 
5 See the Human Rights Watch reports on Egypt for further details. 
6 Such courts have political significance as people with criminal convictions are barred from holding political 
office. 
7 For example, Human Rights Watch reports that around 2,400 people were arrested and held incommunicado 
after the attacks on the Taba Hilton in 2004.    4
family members are often killed and wounded. The policing of demonstrations also often 
results in casualties. In consequence, such casualties turn out to be positively correlated with 
arrests, but the correlation is far from perfect. There is some variation in the number of 
casualties per arrest which may not be entirely random, if the heavy-handedness of police 
interventions varies in a predictable way. Security force actions are legal and officially 
sanctioned, so they are covered in detail by the official press, such as Egypt’s largest daily 
newspaper, Al Ahram. From January 1988 to December 2000 a total of 19,915 arrests of 
suspected Islamists were reported by Al Ahram. In the same period 605 civilians were killed 
and 556 civilians were wounded by the security forces; 114 death sentences were carried out. 
Our dataset, based on the daily reports in Al Ahram, includes figures for the total number of 
political arrests and the total number of civilians killed and wounded by security forces in 
operations against political targets. The time series for arrests and casualties in security force 
operations, aggregated to a monthly frequency, are illustrated in Figures 1-2. As the figures 
show, the distributions of these series are left-skewed, with relatively few occasions on which 
there has been a very high level of activity. In the statistical analysis that follows we will use 
logarithmic transformations of these series and of those discussed below and illustrated in 
Figures 4-6. 
It was not possible to construct a reliable high frequency time series indicator of the 
extent of more general political repression. Repression has many aspects ranging from 
restrictions on the free press, freedom of speech and association and the extent to which 
opposition groups may participate (officially or inofficially) in elections or the political 
process. Freedom House, however, collects annual data on political rights and civil liberties. 
In 1993 Freedom House revised its evaluation of political rights and civil liberties in Egypt, 
demoting it from “Partially Free” to “Not Free”; its rating has remained constant since then.
8 
December 1992 saw a major clampdown on civil society and political participation. Firstly; 
the government announced that it would assume control over all of the country's mosques, in 
an attempt to eliminate the influence of radical Islamists at private religious institutions. 
Secondly the government tightened controls over elections in nongovernmental professional 
associations. Thirdly the People's Assembly passed an amendment to the political parties’ 
                                                 
8 Freedom house assigns a rating for political rights and a rating for civil liberties based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 
1 representing the highest degree of freedom. The average of a country’s political rights and civil liberties ratings 
determines an overall status of Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. From 1993 Egypt has a “political rights” rating of 
6, indicating that it is considered to be ruled by a one-party dictatorship which allows only a minimal 
manifestation of political rights. Its “civil liberties” rating of 6 reflects the severely restricted rights of 
association, and the presence of political prisoners. For further details on the Freedom house criteria for political 
rights and civil liberties ratings see http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm.   5
law, which barred all political activity by groups without legal status and prohibited political 
alliances between these groups and legal political parties.
9 The amendment excluded the 
opposition Muslim Brotherhood (which does not have legal status) from participating in the 
political process through informal alliances with other parties or independent candidates. We 
therefore use a binary variable distinguishing months after December 1992 from months up to 
this date, to indicate the change in the political climate towards a greater degree of repression. 
Another dimension of the state’s response to radical Islamism is the subsidy of staple 
foods such as bread and beans, and price controls on rent, power and fuel. These subsidies 
impose a significant fiscal burden on the government, but their removal is highly politically 
sensitive. When the Egyptian government raised the price of staples as part of the conditions 
of an IMF loan package in 1977, widespread food riots erupted and only ended when the 
government re-established the subsidies programme. Even though Egypt’s main donors have 
repeatedly made a reduction in food subsidies a condition of loans and grants, the government 
has moved extremely cautiously in raising the prices of staples. Food subsidies are perceived 
as part of the social contract between the Egyptian government and the population. Any rises 
in food prices could therefore increase the support for the Islamist opposition, which has a 
very strong agenda for social justice and a history of charitable support for the poor (Abdo, 
2000; Wickham, 2002). The bread price inflation series is illustrated in Figure 3; bread is the 
main staple in Egypt. As the figure shows, the distribution of inflation is highly leptokurtic; 
and its inclusion in our model does not yield a statistically significant coefficient. However, 
we will include a binary variable indicating the months in which the price of bread has risen. 
The interpretation of this variable is that what matters to popular sentiment is the 
government’s decision to relax the cap on the price of bread, rather than the magnitude of the 
subsequent inflation per se.
10 
 
3.2 Islamist Violence 
Al Ahram provides detailed accounts of politically motivated attacks organised by Islamist 
groups, as well as demonstrations and riots. Violent attacks can be split into three distinct 
categories: attacks on Egyptian civilians, attacks on security force personnel and attacks on 
tourists. These three kinds of attack might have different motivations, and might elicit 
different types of state response. The first type of attack has often been the result of an 
                                                 
9 Political parties cannot operate legally unless a license is secured from the Political Parties Committee of the 
Shura Council. This government-controlled body was established in 1977 and approved the first new political 
party in 2004. 
10 Adding bean prices to the model does not increase its explanatory power.   6
escalation of local inter-community arguments and grievances, rather than as part of a planned 
political campaign. The second type of attack is more likely to be interpreted as a threat to 
Egypt’s security, and the third as a threat to its economy.  
  Islamist violence against Egyptian civilians has taken a number of different forms. 
One aspect is inter-community violence, that is, attacks on Copts or their churches and 
property. Many of these attacks have concerned property rights or “protection money”, but 
have acquired political overtones. Another aspect is activity designed to impose shari’a laws 
in Egypt, involving attacks on individuals and activities considered to be “un-Islamic”, such 
as liquor stores, beer deliveries, video-stores and cinemas showing foreign films, as well as 
individuals engaged in “vice”. There has also been some political violence connected to 
elections, during which supporters of different candidates have clashed in violent street fights. 
Finally, there have been assassination attempts on politicians and other public figures, such as 
poets, authors and academics, who have been singled out for the political or religious views 
taken in their writing.
11 We will aggregate all these attacks into a single category, illustrated 
in Figure 4. There is no robust statistical evidence for any asymmetries in the way in which 
the different components of this series are determined, or in which they elicit a state response.  
  Islamists have also killed or wounded a large number of security force personnel, 
including both official and secret police. These attacks are recorded in Figure 5.  
Attacks on tourists (Figure 6) might help radical Islamistss to achieve a number of 
goals. Firstly, killing foreign nationals has ensured international publicity for the Islamist 
movement. Secondly, tourism is a significant part of economic activity; according to Tohamy 
and Swinscoe (2000), it accounts for 11.6% of GDP, if one accounts for the secondary effects 
of tourist spending. Disrupting the tourist industry has directly affected government revenues 
and foreign exchange receipts. Attacking foreigners may also have had an ideological 
motivation. Tourists may have been targeted as the indirect representatives of different 
ideological values and political cultures that are seen to threaten national culture, tradition and 
religious convictions, while their presence is perceived to have brought little direct benefit to 
local communities (Aziz, 1996).  
  Tourist attacks have taken the form of sniper shootings at passing cruise ships, 
passenger trains and tourist buses, the bombing of buses and cafes and the shooting of 
foreigners at tourist attractions. The main series of 25 attacks against tourists started in 
August 1992; attacks occurred every 2-6 months until March 1995. A further series of three 
                                                 
11 Examples include the writer and satirist Faraq Foda and the Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz.   7
attacks occurred between November 1995 and March 1996, with two final attacks in 
September and November 1997, the last in our sample being the shooting of 88 tourists and 
locals at the temple of Hatshepsout in Luxor. This massacre undermined public support for 
the radical Islamists, and there were no further attacks on tourists during the sample period. 
We will use two measures of violence against tourists. The first is a continuous measure of 
the number killed or wounded each month (usually zero); the second is a binary variable 
recording the months when a tourist attack occurred, sometimes without any ensuing 
casualties.  
  Our final measure of anti-state activity is a binary variable identifying each month in 
which Al Ahram reports “riots” or “demonstrations”. In the 13 years covered by this study we 
observe 53 months in which Egyptian civilians took to the street, or political prisoners rioted 
in prisons. Mostly the reported “riots” refer to localised incidents with a relatively small 
number of people smashing shop windows, setting fire to cars and attacking security forces. 
“Riots” occur for a number of reasons, including sectarian disagreements between Christians 
and Muslims, protests over prison conditions, industrial disputes, supporters of different 
candidates clashing during election campaigns and riots ignited by deaths in custody, with 
family members attacking the security forces over unexplained deaths. Other “riots” appear to 
be sparked by the heavy handed policing of potentially peaceful demonstrations organised by 
political activists in universities and colleges and by attendees of Friday prayers in radical 
mosques. Riots are likely to be more spontaneous than, for example, planned attacks on 
tourists. 
 
4. Modelling the Conflict 
4.1 Modelling the intensity of Islamist attacks and counter-insurgency 
Our modelling strategy is designed to address two main questions. Firstly, we wish to know 
how the Egyptian government’s policy responses to radical Islamist activity have impacted on 
subsequent Islamist activity. The dimensions of policy are: the number of political arrests, the 
number of civilians killed or wounded in security force attacks, the general level of freedom 
in Egypt (as captured by the Freedom House index), and the price of bread. The dimensions 
of Islamist activity are: the occurrence of attacks on tourists, the number of security force 
personnel killed in Islamist attacks and the incidence of riots. We do not attempt to model the 
intensity of inter-community conflict, as captured by the number of civilian-on-civilian 
attacks; this is a heterogeneous category including many “spontaneous” violent incidents that 
are not part of any planned campaign.    8
Our second question concerns the way in which past violence, as measured by riots 
and all kinds of violence, influences the current policy of the government, as captured by the 
first two policy dimensions listed in the previous paragraph. (It has not been possible to model 
the second two: the Freedom House index does not contain enough in-sample variation and 
the price of bread is determined partly as a result of negotiations between the Egyptian 
government and international aid donors for which we do not have adequate quantitative 
data.) The variables in our analysis, all measured monthly over 1988-2000, are as follows.
12 
 
cas  Number of civilians arrested by the security forces 
ckws 
Number of Egyptian civilians killed and wounded by the security 
forces 
sfkw  Number of security force personnel killed and wounded 
ckwc   Number of Egyptian civilians killed and wounded by other civilians 
tkw  Number of tourists killed and wounded 
iftat   Binary variable = 1 if there was any tourist attack in the month  
iffree  
Binary variable = 1 from 1993 onwards (when the Freedom House 
indicator classes Egypt as “Not Free”) 
ifriot   Binary variable = 1 if there was a riot in the month 
ifbread   Binary variable = 1 if the price of bread rose in the month  
 
We construct regression equations for five of these variables. Equations for cas and ckws are 
designed to identify the factors affecting the state’s response to Islamist activity; equations for 
sfkw, ifkw and ifriot are designed to identify the factors driving the intensity of the Islamist 
activity. Of these five dependent variables the first three are continuous, but include some 
zero values, while the last two are binary. So the first three are modelled by Tobit regressions, 
and the last two by Probit regressions. In the Tobit regressions the latent values (xt*) of each 
dependent variable (xt) are determined by autoregressive processes of the following form. 
                                                 
12 All of the continuous variables in this list appear to be stationary in levels.   9
 ln(1+cas)t* = β0 + β1(L)ln(1+ckwc)t-1 + β2(L)ln(1+tkw)t-1 + β3(L)ln(1+sfkwc)t-1   (1) 
        + β4·(ifriot)t-1+ β5·(iffree)t + β6(L)ln(1+cas)t-1 + ε t      
 
 ln(1+ckws)t* = γ 0 + γ 1(L)ln(1+ckwc)t-1 + γ 2(L)ln(1+tkw)t-1 + γ 3(L)ln(1+sfkwc)t-1   (2) 
             + γ 4·(ifriot)t-1+ γ 5·(iffree)t + γ 6(L)ln(1+ckws)t-1 + η t  
 
 ln(1+sfkw)t* = δ 0 + δ 1(L)ln(1+cas)t-1 + δ 2(L)ln(1+ckws)t-1 + δ 3·(ifbread)t     (3) 
          + δ 4·(iffre)t + δ 5(L)ln(1+sfkw)t-1 + θ t    
 
xt = xt* when xt* > 0, otherwise xt = 0. Note the use of a logarithmic transformation. The 
terms in L are lag polynomial operators; ε t, η t and θ t represent random errors. For the two 
binary dependent variables, we employ a Probit specification in which the latent probabilities 
П are determined by Normal cumulative density functions of the following form. 
 
П(iftat)t = F(φ 0 + φ 1(L)ln(1+cas)t-1 + φ 2(L)ln(1+ckws)t-1 + φ 3·(ifbread)t + φ 4·(iffre)t  (4) 
  + φ 5(L)(iftat)t-1) + ξ t         
 
П(ifriot)t = F(κ 0 + κ 1(L)ln(1+cas)t-1 + κ 2(L)ln(1+ckws)t-1 + κ 3·(ifbread)t + κ 4·(iffre)t  (5) 
      + κ 5(L)(ifriot)t-1) + ω t   
 
ξ t and ω t represent random errors. In each of the five equations a lag order of two suffices to 
ensure that the errors are free from serial autocorrelation. Lags of a higher order are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels of confidence. 
  Equations (1-2) are designed to estimate the magnitude of the state response to (i) past 
violence directed at Egyptian civilians, (ii) past violence directed at tourists, (iii) past violence 
directed at security force personnel and (iv) the incidence of riots. In this way, we will be able 
to determine whether a particular form of Islamist insurgency represents an especially large 
response because it is perceived to be the most serious form of threat to the state. The 
equations are also conditioned on the Freedom House index. On the one hand, we might 
expect the security force response to have been more muted in the early 1990s, when the 
Egyptian legal system was still guaranteeing some limited political freedom.
13 On the other, 
the sort of security force activity recorded in our cas and ckws variables might have been a 
substitute for more general forms of repression, and therefore higher in the early 1990s. 
                                                 
13 A small part of the index is determined by the number of political prisoners, so there is a potential concern 
about its independence in equation (1). However, given the changes in the legal system after December 1992, a 
lower number of prisoners is unlikely to have mitigated the decline in Egypt’s freedom rating.   10
  Equations (3-5) are designed to estimate the size of the response of different 
dimensions of insurgency to the recent policy of the security forces, as captured by (i) the 
number of political arrests and (ii) the number of casualties in police attacks. They will also 
capture the extent to which insurgency is affected by (iii) an economic factor, the price of 
bread and (iv) the general decline in the level of freedom in Egypt in December 1992. 
Note the difference between the (lagged) tourist attacks variable tkw on the right hand 
side of equations (1-2), which is continuous, and the binary dependent variable iftat in 
equation (4). The use of iftat is motivated by the fact that there have been only 19 attacks on 
tourists in which at least one foreigner was killed or wounded. There were a further 11 attacks 
(recorded as ones in the iftat series and zeroes the tkw series) in which no foreigner was hurt, 
but the intention to harm was clearly present. It is unlikely that extremists exactly 
premeditated the number of people to be killed in attacks, so there is little information about 
Islamist strategy in the actual number killed or wounded. However, the security forces are 
likely to respond to successful attacks in a more energetic way than they are to unsuccessful 
ones, and to large massacres of tourists in a much more energetic way, so we retain the 
continuous variable tkw in equations (1-2). 
 
4.2 Results 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. It can be seen that 
there is some variation across variables in terms of the fraction of observations that are strictly 
positive; however, the distributions of the positive values of the continuous variables are quite 
similar. Tables 2-5 report our regression results. The sample consists of monthly observations 
from 1988 to 2000; with two lags this gives us 154 observations.
14 In addition to the 
regressions corresponding to equations (1-5), the tables show the results of more 
parsimonious regression specifications selected to minimize the Akaike Information Criterion. 
Those coefficients significantly different from zero in the unrestricted regressions generally 
remain so in the restricted regressions (the exceptions being noted below), and none of the 
estimated coefficients is significantly different across the two alternative specifications, so we 
are reasonably confident of the overall robustness of our results. Tables 2-4 report the 
estimates of the coefficients in equations (1-5). Table 5 reports the marginal probabilities – 
that is, the sample means of the partial derivatives of the fitted probability functions – implicit 
in the Probit models in Tables 3-4 and in the Probit part of the Tobit models in Tables 2-3. 
                                                 
14 In the equations in which ifbread appears the sample is only 143 observations, because bread prices are 
missing for January-July 1988 and February-July 1989.   11
  Table 2 shows the regression results for the anti-Islamist activity of the state: (i) 
arrests and (ii) civilians killed and wounded by the security forces. In the arrests equation the 
sum of the ckwc coefficients is 0.45 (and the second lag is significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level). The coefficients on lags of the dependent variable are close to and 
insignificantly different from zero, so a sustained increase in the number of deaths and 
injuries in civilian-on-civilian attacks by one percent could eventually be expected to increase 
the number of arrests by just under half of one percent (assuming that the initial number of 
arrests is positive). The corresponding figures for the other forms of Islamist violence, 
security force casualties sfkw and tourist casualties tkw, are 0.63 and 0.86 respectively; the 
latter is significantly larger than the ckwc figure. This suggests that tourist casualties are 
viewed more seriously than Egyptian casualties, and possibly that Egyptian police casualties 
are viewed more seriously than Egyptian civilian ones. Nevertheless, there is a substantial 
reaction to all forms of Islamist violence. 
  In the unrestricted regression for civilians killed and wounded by the security forces, 
the sums of the coefficients on ckwc, sfkw and tkw are 0.31, 0.39 and 0.43 respectively. All 
are significantly different from zero (tkw marginally so), but not from each other. The 
coefficient on the first lag of the dependent variable is a little over 0.3 and also statistically 
significant. So a temporary increase in Islamist activity leads to an increase in the number of 
casualties in security force operations that is proportionately smaller, but more prolonged 
than, the corresponding increase in arrests.  
  The coefficients on the riot variable ifriot are negative in both the arrests equation and 
the civilian casualties equations. However, the coefficients are never significant at the 5% 
level, so there is not strong evidence that riots have any systematic impact on policing policy. 
The coefficient on the political freedom variable iffree is also negative in both equations, but 
statistically insignificant in the civilian casualties equation. In the unrestricted arrests equation 
it is significant at the 1% level (the point estimate of the coefficient is -0.73), although the t-
ratio drops sharply in the restricted arrests equation. So there is some evidence that the decline 
in political freedoms in the 1990s was associated with a lower number of arrests. This result is 
consistent with the conjecture that arrests are in some sense a substitute for the more general 
forms of political repression captured by iffree. 
  Table 2 shows the state security forces responding to all forms of Islamist violence. 
Table 3, which shows the fitted models corresponding to equations (3-4) above, indicates that 
there is more heterogeneity in the forces driving the Islamist violence itself. The arrests 
variable  cas is the only one that is significantly different form zero in the tourist attack   12
equation and the only one that is insignificantly different from zero in the security force 
casualty equation. Attacks on tourists are more likely in the wake of an increase in the number 
of political arrests, but security force operations that lead to civilian casualties do not in 
themselves make tourist attacks more likely; nor does the price of bread or the Freedom 
House measure of political freedom. Implicit in the marginal probability estimates in Table 5 
is the prediction that a sustained 1% increase in the number of arrests would increase the 
probability of an attack by over 0.07%.
15 In contrast, the number of security force casualties 
in Islamist attacks does not depend on the number of arrests, but rather the past number of 
casualties in security force attacks ckws and whether there has been an increase in the price of 
bread (captured by ifbread). A percentage point increase in the past number of casualties in 
security force attacks can be expected to increase the current number of security force 
casualties by around one half of a percentage point. A bread price increase raises security 
force casualties by over 40%. There is also a marginally significant negative coefficient on the 
freedom index iffree, slightly smaller than the corresponding coefficient on ifbread. 
  The results suggest that attacks on security force personnel are partly revenge attacks 
in response to casualties inflicted by the security forces themselves in the past. We saw in 
Table 1 that security force attacks increase in response to higher past casualties among the 
security forces, so there is a “circle of violence” linking Islamist attacks and security force 
operations. However, the response coefficients are well below unity in both cases, so the 
effect of shocks that increase sfkw or ckws will die away eventually. Moreover, attacks on the 
security forces are also highly responsive to the price of bread, so economic conditions do 
have a role to play in the circle of violence. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
attacks on the security forces are driven largely by grievances about injuries caused in heavy-
handed police operations, and about the cost of living. By contrast, attacks on tourists depend 
just on the number of political arrests, and are in this sense more politicised. Recall from 
Table 1 that the number of tourist casualties is the variable with the largest influence on the 
number of arrests, so there is a second distinct loop connecting the intensity of state and anti-
state activity. 
  Finally, Table 4 provides some evidence on the factors that make riots more likely. 
The price of bread has no impact on the likelihood of a riot in the next month; the impact of 
the number of arrests and casualties in security force operations is small and of marginal 
statistical significance. The incidence of riots appears to be almost entirely random, except for 
                                                 
15 The sum of the cas coefficients in the iftat column in Table 4 is 0.0267 + 0.0514 = 0.0781.   13
the fact that they have been significantly less frequent since the reduction in political 
freedoms at the end of 1992, as captured by the iffree dummy. The changes to the Egyptian 
constitution that limit legitimate forms of expression have led to an increase in more violent 
forms of protest. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate the reaction of both Islamist extremists and the Egyptian security 
forces to past events using a new dataset on political violence in Egypt during 1988-2000. The 
analysis suggests that violent conflict in Egypt had the potential to escalate. Islamists increase 
attacks on the security forces in response to civilians being killed and wounded by the 
security forces. The security forces in turn intensify anti-Islamist attacks in response to 
increases in Islamist violence.  
While arrests of Islamists do not appear to influence violence against security forces in 
the following months, they do raise the probability of attacks on foreigners. This is consistent 
with the conjecture that tourist attacks are intended at least partly as a political gesture in 
response to a perception of greater political repression by the state. Moreover, arrests made by 
the armed police are also often associated with civilian casualties, both among the suspected 
Islamists and innocent bystanders. These casualties in turn fuel further violence against the 
security forces, which can lead to an escalation of violence. 
The police react particularly strongly to deaths among foreigners and members of the 
security forces. The more muted response to Islamist attacks on civilians suggests that there 
was some toleration of Islamist movements regarding their aims to impose shari’a laws, as 
long as these violent activities were not directly harmful to the state.  
The evidence on the effect of political liberties is less clear. There is some evidence 
that the armed struggle of Islamists against the security forces has increased since 1993, while 
the probability of riots and demonstrations (at least, of reported riots and demonstrations) has 
decreased. Given that riot policing has often resulted in large-scale arrests and casualties, a 
decrease in demonstrations would improve political stability. On the other hand the results are 
could be interpreted as indicating a shift from essentially non-violent means of protest 
(demonstrations) to armed conflict. 
Finally, there is some evidence for a direct link between increases in poverty and the 
intensity of radical Islamist activity. (Although in this case the activity appears to be directed 
against the organs of the state rather than against foreigners.) When the price of bread rises, 
the subsequent months see a rise in Islamist violence. The removal of bread subsidies has   14
been motivated by budgetary concerns, mainly at the behest of international aid donors. Our 
results suggest that this may be a false economy. The government budget surplus derived 
from removing subsidies is offset by the cost of the anti-state violence that results. 
  In conclusion, Egypt’s experience with the suppression of Islamist movements 
suggests that a strategy of state-sponsored violence has not been effective in creating political 
stability. Any gains from withdrawing political dissidents and armed extremists from 
circulation through death or imprisonment appears to have been offset by increased public 
support for the violent Islamist movements. The evidence from Egypt, which also seem to 
tally with the evidence from the Israeli / Palestinian conflict, suggests that countries with a 
more recent history of political violence (such as Saudi Arabia) might be well advised to 
consider better ways of engaging with the Islamist movements. 
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Table 1: Some Descriptive Statistics 
 
variable 
fraction of zero 
observations 
mean of positive 
observations 
standard deviation of 
positive observations 
       
ln(1+cas) 17/156  3.94  1.62 
ln(1+ckws) 63/156  2.10  0.98 
ln(1+sfkw) 58/156  1.99  0.91 
ln(1+ckwc) 78/156  2.07  0.87 
ln(1+tkw) 137/156  2.04  0.99 
iftat  126/156    
iffree  60/156    
ifriot  103/156    
ifbread  71/143    
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Table 2: Anti-Islamist Activity Regression Coefficients 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
 
  Tobit for arrests, ln(1+cas)t 
 
Tobit for civilians killed / wounded 
by security forces, ln(1+ckws)t 
  unrestricted restricted  unrestricted restricted 
-0.0119     0.3075   0.3854  [dependent 
variable]t-1  (0.0982)   (0.1582)*  (0.1268)*** 
 0.0673     0.1554    [dependent 
variable]t-2  (0.0893)   (0.1577)  
ln(1+ckwc)t-1   0.0892     0.1941   0.2797 
 (0.1406)   (0.1324)  (0.1207)** 
ln(1+ckwc)t-2  0.3628   0.4062   0.1221   
   (0.1472)**  (0.1428)***  (0.1353)   
ln(1+sfkw)t-1   0.3880   0.3630   0.0963    
    (0.1580)** (0.1445)** (0.1759)   
ln(1+sfkw)t-2   0.2417    0.2764   0.2905   0.4359 
   -0.1590  (0.1446)*  (0.1722)*  (0.1264)*** 
ln(1+tkw)t-1   0.4935   0.5345   0.1672   
   (0.2024)**  (0.1980)***  (0.1816)   
ln(1+tkw)t-2   0.3635   0.3566   0.2668   0.2922 
    (0.2058)* (0.2016)* (0.1785)  (0.1752)* 
ifriott-1  -0.4001   -0.5614 -0.4908 
 (0.3653)   (0.3348)*  (0.3069) 
iffreet  -0.7329 -0.5417 -0.2188  
 (0.3618)**  (0.3287)  (0.3524)   
intercept   2.3496  2.3208  -0.4169  -0.4695 
  (0.4050)*** (0.2639)*** (0.3125)  (0.2685)* 
residual s.d.   1.7642   1.7775   1.5530   1.5713 
  (0.1102)*** (0.1111)*** (0.1241)*** (0.1256)*** 
observations  154 154 154 154 
pseudo R
2  0.090 0.086 0.124 0.118 
log  likelihood  -293.3 -294.5 -215.2 -216.8 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
    17
Table 3: Islamist Activity Regression Coefficients 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
 
   Tobit for security forces killed / 
wounded, ln(1+sfkw)t 
Probit for tourist attacks, iftatt 
  unrestricted restricted  unrestricted restricted 
 0.1565     0.3283    [dependent 
variable]t-1  (0.1515)   (0.3376)  
 0.0791     0.7200   0.7932  [dependent 
variable]t-2  (0.1558)   (0.3586)**  (0.3431)** 
ln(1+cas)t-1 
 
 0.0490     0.1411   0.2082 
 (0.0768)    (0.0962)  (0.0948)** 
ln(1+cas)t-2 
 
 0.0561     0.2717   0.3076 
 (0.0778)    (0.1180)**  (0.1101)*** 
ln(1+ckws)t-1   0.3020   0.4468   0.0989   
 (0.1346)**  (0.1052)***  (0.1147)     
ln(1+ckws)t-2   0.1863   0.2978  -0.0215   
 (0.1366)  (0.1062)***  (0.1108)   
ifbreadt   0.5034   0.5625   0.1820   
 (0.2436)**  (0.2435)**  (0.2924)   
iffreet   0.3600   0.4510   0.1167   
 (0.2853)  (0.2721)*  (0.3171)   
intercept  -0.8487 -0.5817 -3.1424 -3.2162 
 (0.3791)**  (0.2789)**  (0.5382)***  (0.5069)*** 
residual s.d.   1.3432   1.3567    
  (0.1073)*** (0.1084)***   
observations  143 143 143 154 
pseudo R
2  0.124 0.116 0.328 0.327 
log  likelihood  -199.9 -201.5 -49.36 -51.10 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       18
Table 4: Riots Regression Coefficients 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
 
  Probit for riots, ifriott 
   unrestricted  restricted 
ifriott-1   -0.3214  -0.3595 
  (0.2767)  (0.2678) 
ifriott-2   -0.0696   
  (0.2869)   
ln(1+cas)t-1 
 
   0.1448   0.1286 
  (0.0738)**  (0.0670)* 
ln(1+cas)t-2 
 
   0.0298   
  (0.0790)   
ln(1+ckws)t-1 
 
   0.1832   0.1653 
  (0.1159)  (0.1004)* 
ln(1+ckws)t-2 
 
   0.0175   
  (0.1180)   
ifbreadt     0.0104   
  (0.2431)   
iffreet   -1.3526  -1.3798 
  (0.3014)***  (0.2539)*** 
intercept   -0.4625  -0.1867 
  (0.3637)  (0.2611) 
observations   143  154 
pseudo R
2   0.156  0.150 
log likelihood    -74.53  -84.09 
 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     19
Table 5: Marginal Probabilities in the Unrestricted Regression Equations 
The table reports the sample means of the partial derivatives of the fitted probability functions 





 ln(1+cas)t   ln(1+ckws)t ln(1+sfkw)t iftatt  ifriott 
           
ln(1+cas)t-1  -0.0006     0.0101   0.0267  0.0424 
ln(1+cas)t-2    0.0035     0.0116   0.0514   0.0087 
ln(1+ckws)t-1     0.0603   0.0625   0.0187   0.0537 
ln(1+ckws)t-2     0.0305   0.0385  -0.0041   0.0051 
iftatt-1         0.0622   
iftatt-2         0.1363   
ifriott-1 -0.0209  -0.1101      -0.0942 
ifriott-2         -0.0204 
ln(1+ckwc)t-1   0.0047   0.0381       
ln(1+ckwc)t-2   0.0189   0.0240       
ln(1+tkw)t-1   0.0257   0.0328       
ln(1+tkw)t-2   0.0190   0.0523       
ln(1+sfkw)t-1   0.0202   0.0189   0.0324     
ln(1+sfkw)t-2   0.0126   0.0570   0.0164     
iffreet  -0.0382  -0.0429   0.0745   0.0221  -0.3965 
ifbreadt       0.1041   0.0345   0.0030 
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Figure 6: Monthly Tourists Killed or Wounded (tkw) 
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